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Internet Power and Social Context: A Globalization Approach to Web
Privacy Concerns
Rivka Ribak and Joseph Turow
Contemporary perspectives on the Internet don't recognize negotiations about its meaning that
take place in many societies, causing the Web to be defined simultaneously in terms of local
cultures and world markets. We propose a “globalization” perspective that can help researchers
situate a society’s cultural and technological practices within broad political and economic
parameters, identify global forces and local voices, and study dynamics of their co-existence. As
an exploratory foray, we compare U.S. and Israeli parents' attitudes toward Web privacy. The
findings call attention to a need for historical and geographical considerations at every level of
Web research.
Many observers in the United States relate the adoption of the Internet to a sense of
erosion in domestic privacy and parental authority. Numerous books, academic articles, public
opinion polls, and press reports (as well as solutions and regulations) alert Americans to the
allegedly inescapable consequences of the introduction of an additional eye (ear/mouth) into the
home's technological environment (Andrejevic, 2002; Cai & Gantz, 2000; Shapiro, 1998; Turow,
2001). The tone of inevitability underlying the discourse about Web privacy in the United States
implies that these concerns also carry over into other societies as the Web spreads across the
world. Yet, while seemingly the ultimate metaphor of globalization, the Web is experienced
locally by individual users embedded in particular families, cultures, and politics. In what ways,
then, do users' approaches to the Web derive from their “indigenous” cultural construction of the
machine? Where do they draw on U.S. values and fears, as embedded in U.S. cultural and
technological exports?
Our purpose here is to suggest a framework for answering these questions by
constructing the Web's global and local faces as a dialogue that is anchored within transnational
political and economic bearings. By situating a society's cultural and technological practices
within broad political and economic parameters, we can identify global forces and local voices,
and study the dynamics of their co-existence. As an exploratory foray using this approach, we
present a comparative survey of U.S. and Israeli parents' attitudes toward the Web and Web
privacy. The survey highlights the cultural specificity of information disclosure practices but
suggests, at the same time, that global influences may be at work. As constituted, the data do not
allow us to causally tie these complex patterns to particular extra-national influences. They do,
however, help define the areas in which these influences might be fruitfully explored in future
studies, and they point out the usefulness of bringing historical and geographical considerations
to every level of Web research.

The Need for a Global System Perspective
Accounts of the global spread of the Web have tended to adopt two contrasting
narratives. According to the first, technology's inherent features spark the same opportunities and
challenges and so, the same concerns and meanings, for users around the world (for an
elaboration, see Buckingham, 2000; Fischer, 1992). The alternative narrative insists that

technology—both the hardware and the social meanings that are associated with it—is socially
constructed (see MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999).
Works that adopt the first, essentialist/universalistic narrative, assume that technology
affects people and societies in predictable and inevitable ways. Writing about privacy, for
example, Garfinkle (2000) argues that “[t]echnology is not privacy neutral. The overwhelming
tendency of technology is to out privacy. By its very nature, technology is intrusive” (p. 260).
These works note that the Web's elementary hardware—computers, monitors, and network
connections—can be seen everywhere one looks. The same holds true for the basic software—
the browsers, search engines, chat rooms, and instant messaging systems that link millions of
“surfers” worldwide. These works imply, therefore, that the whole world is exposed to
essentially the same Web; and that effects, problems, and solutions inescapably derive from the
technology, and are generalizable universally to virtually all locales. (see, for example,
Cavoukian & Tapscott, 1997; for discussion, see Agre, 1997; Bennet & Grant, 1999.)
Relativist works, by contrast, suggest that although the telephone, radio, and television,
for example, have distinctive technological features, the social meanings and controversies
around these features developed over time through elaborate interactions among various
constituencies, value systems, and regulatory regimes (Marvin, 1998; Rakow, 1992; Silverstone
& Hirsch, 1992). From this perspective the fluid, multilingual, and radically interactive Web, in
particular, subverts any attempt to construe it as a fixed entity, as it allows for and indeed
cultivates intertwined and mutually-constitutive relationships between medium, text, and
consumers/audiences/users (see, for example, Lyon & Zureik, 1996).
In this way, relativist works introduce users into the study of the human-machine
interaction and position them as active shapers, decision-makers, and producers of meaning (e.g.,
Ribak, 1997). Significantly, they situate users within communities, in actual times and places
(e.g., Bakardjieva, 2003; Na, 2001). Thus, arguing for the embeddedness of ongoing humanmachine interdependence, Livingstone (1998) emphasizes the significance of sociopolitical and
economic context in relation to an important project on “young people and the changing media
environment in Europe” that she helped coordinate:
Contexts of media use are elaborated…in two main ways. First, differences in social,
cultural, economic and political structures both across and within European countries
are likely to make a difference to children and young people's media use. Second,
among western countries these structures are themselves subject to broader processes
of modernization, processes which have particular significance for young
people…To the extent that different countries represent different positions on these
broad structural variables, including the diffusion find appropriation of media,
comparative analysis offers a kind of natural experiment for explaining the meanings,
uses and impacts of new media within each country (p. 445).

The Need for a Third View
The technological-universalistic and constructionist-relativist narratives of technological
diffusion and globalization, of cultural adoption and localization, are clearly incongruent and
indeed mutually exclusive. It is interesting, then, that what is common to both is a reluctance to
situate the human-machine encounters they explore in the context of transnational political and
economic relations that underlie these processes. Thus, where essentialist thinkers privilege the
Web's global impact with little attention to local contexts, relativist and comparative analyses
similarly overlook the interplay of the local with the transnational. Livingstone (1998), for

example, practically rules out a cross-cultural research design in which countries are structurally
interdependent or disproportionately influencing one another when it comes to new media. She
argues that “to make…comparisons [between countries] manageable in practice, the research
should be restricted to modernized, western countries which are undergoing related sociopolitical
changes; overlarge national differences would prevent observations interesting in one country
being informative for another” (1998, p. 445).1
The upshot of this guiding principle is that the dominant interest in reporting the results
of the European project is on cross-national comparison without cross-national influence. Thus,
four of the five studies presented in a European Journal of Communication issue devoted to the
twelve-country project headed by Livingstone (1998) treat the countries they compare as
unrelated entities. They ignore the fact that many are geographically close to one another, many
share languages and cultural products, and all belong to a European Economic Community that
is developing pan-continental rules about electronic commerce, Internet privacy, and a host of
other activities that affect life on the Web. The one exception to this hermetic approach (Lemish,
Drotner, Liebes, Maigret, & Stald, 1998; see also Drotner, 2001) offers an account of
globalization as a conflation of cultural practices. Yet it still avoids asking where the “global”
originates, what forces lie behind its interpenetration of the local, and whether that
interpenetration takes place differently in countries that have substantially different sociopolitical
and socioeconomic environments.

The Utility of a Political Economy of Cultural Globalization
In order to account for users' cultural constructions of technology and to make sense of
their specific ideas about Web privacy, we must contextualize technological development and
human practice within broad economic and ideological parameters. Both software and hardware
play a major role in today's international trade. The economic relationships that develop in the
world markets for such information products recall the division of nations into a political
hierarchy of core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral nations that Immanual Wallerstein and others
have employed for analyzing international domination (Wallerstein, 1980; Skocpol, 1984). The
model proposes that certain economic actors (predominantly corporations), based in a few core
nations or regions, hold determinant influence on both the disposition and the effective
operation, as well as the output, of less developed peripheral and semi-peripheral parts of the
world. This, in turn, “enables the extension of the authority of the economic and social model”
encouraged by the core nations (Gaspar, 1999, p. 3).
Recent writings on globalization challenge the construction of international economic
hierarchy as an explanation for the colonialist shaping of social actions and attitudes. Placing
caveats on such linear reasoning, they raise important questions about the nature and direction of
ideological influence (see Curran & Park, 2000; Robertson, 1997; Sreberny-Mohammadi,
Winseck, McKenna, & Boyd-Barrett, 1997). Appadurai (1996), for example, insists on the
subversive, local, and liberating potential of globalization for diasporic ethnics around the world.
But the emphasis on the democratizing potential of global access runs the risk of overlooking the
political economy of power. Such perspectives may thus underestimate the role that economic
domination emanating from hegemonic nations or regions plays in framing local cultural ideas
about what a particular technology should “do,” how it ought to be distributed and used, and to
whom it ought to be sold.
In an attempt to develop an approach to media technology that is sensitive to the interplay
between global forces and local appropriations, we suggest a political economy of cultural

globalization. Our perspective conceives of globalization as a dialogue between hegemonic
interests and cultural practices, and uses the international economic and political power structure
as a starting point for investigating transnational ideological influences. At the same time, it
contextualizes and historicizes those local attitudes, practices, interpretations, and ideologies that
assign culturally specific positions, roles, and meanings to technologies. As a result, it is
attentive to the flows of influence from many directions, at many levels, and across time.
This dualistic approach is crucial when it comes to the Internet and information
disclosure. By its very nature, the topic involves an intersection of global forces and local voices,
technological facts and cultural choices. In political-economic terms, the Internet was developed
at the core of the world system, among the wealthiest and most powerful nations. With
significant European contributions, it evolved mainly in U.S. scientific establishments, originally
for military purposes. Core-country corporate Internet leaders such as Microsoft, Intel, AMD,
and 3Com subsequently situated strategic outposts in parts of the world that reflect different
positions along an innovation/cheap-labor continuum: Some nations (e.g., Finland, Israel, and
India) are relied on for their ability to contribute cutting-edge knowledge about hardware and
software. Other countries (e.g. Indonesia and Malaysia) provide inexpensive, stable, and
compliant manufacturing conditions. Independent firms in all regions vie to provide the large
companies with component parts as well as to export their own innovations to Web-linked
consumers (Kellerman, 2000).
What is especially interesting about these relationships is that firms based outside the
core often find it most profitable to create software and hardware that do not necessarily speak to
their own cultural, practical, and ideological concerns. Instead, they address their products to
their most prominent markets (Arora, Gambardella, & Torrisi, 2001). Web privacy, security, and
child surfing, for example, are topics that have generated huge investments by consumers and
Web firms in the world's wealthiest regions. To participate in the revenues engendered by
software and hardware tied to these concerns, industries at the periphery and semi-periphery of
the western economy must keep up with debates regarding media policy and technological
fixes that take place in front of U.S. regulatory agencies, the European Commission, and within
English-speaking academic circles.
What are the implications of such globalizing tendencies for members of a non-core
society when the values embedded in their major, core-oriented software and hardware exports
do not resonate with their own local sentiments? For example, will members of a non-core
society translate their traditional views on information disclosure into Web attitudes and
practices even when they do not match the Web-privacy approaches that occupy global media
and business interests? Such questions imply propositions regarding comparative research that
are quite different from the ones that Livingstone posits about the comparison of equivalent,
impermeable core countries. Here the emphasis is on sharply different socioeconomic conditions,
on often-contrasting political and cultural circumstances, and, importantly, on international
relationships and cross-influences.

The Case of Israel and the United States
A comparison of attitudes between Israelis and Americans on Web-related topics allows
us to begin deciphering the interplay of technology, hegemony, and the local construction of
meaning. The positions of Israel and the United States within the hierarchy of the global system
are strikingly different. In contrast to the United States, a continent-spanning nation of more than
300 million people with a gross domestic product of U.S. $36,200 per capita, Israel, with about

6.4 million inhabitants, has a GDP of U.S. $18,900 per capita (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,
2002). Similarly, whereas the U.S.'s international economic and military influence places it
unchallenged at the core of the world system, Israel may be considered outside that core.
Despite the large share of knowledge-based export in its economy (Israeli Ministry of Finance,
2002) and in contrast to additional indicators of economic growth,2 Israel's troubled borders and
slate of occupation and the related military expenditure, as well as comparative measures of
inequality (Adva Center, 2002) relegate it to an intermediate position in the world system.
In spite of this gap, Israel is increasingly linked to the United States by high-tech
relationships. Many U.S.-based multinational firms—Intel, Cisco Systems, 3Com, IBM, and
Microsoft—have established foreign subsidiaries and R&D centers in the country. Moreover, a
large number of indigenous companies are competing with an eye to creating hardware and
software that can serve security, privacy, networking, and broadband needs in the United States
and elsewhere. The Israeli economy has been intent on satisfying U.S. and European demands
for high-tech and often Web-related products. As the partner in a major high-tech venture fund
noted (San Francisco Business Times, 2002), “Israel is a very export-oriented country (p. 37).”
A computer industry recruitment site aimed at English speakers (Hi-Link, 2002)
exemplifies the two-way flow between Israel and the United States, suggesting that although
exports throughout the globe are the goal, a U.S. frame of reference is dominant. In mid-2002,
the site noted that “like other high-tech centers around the world, the high-tech industry in Israel
is directly impacted by the stalled U.S. economy (p. 1).” Nevertheless, it pointed out, “with some
one hundred (mostly high-tech) companies traded in the U.S., Israel is second only to Canada in
terms of foreign presence on U.S. stock markets (p. 3).” Consequently, “with the establishment
of many American subsidiaries in Israel and the development of the internet in English, your
mother-tongue is definitely an asset (p. 6).”
The mutual Israel-U.S. interest that we identify at the corporate and worker levels is
crucial at the level of management. Israeli executives keep their ears to the ground regarding
social as well as technological developments in core regions of the world (especially the United
States, Europe, and the United Kingdom) with an interest in capitalizing on the needs that arise
in these potential markets. From pioneering Firewall security software in the early 1990s to
recent encryption products that address recording conglomerates' problems with Web-based
copyright infringements many home-grown innovations are heralded in the general Israeli press
not for speaking to Israeli sensibilities but for expanding exports. Newspapers' financial sections
provide their readers with detailed reports about U.S. regulatory and advocacy debates about the
nature and right to information privacy as well as parents' concerns about keeping their children
safe from objectionable content and predators on the Web. These developments come up in
discussions of new product possibilities, in the coverage of Israeli privacy violations, and in the
typical reporting that goes on about things American.
But the linkage with the United States is not limited to business interests. Growing fast,
the number of Israeli surfers was a bit less than a third of the nation's homes in early 2002.3 With
relatively few sites in Hebrew available to them,4 Israeli users navigate to U.S. sites and
communicate through U.S. applications, using software and hardware that (wherever produced)
map onto U.S. ideology in general and concerns about privacy in particular. Moreover, films
such as The Net, which enact U.S. information disclosure nightmares, are frequent television
fare. Prevalent, too, are magazine and newspaper feature articles that translate U.S. concerns into
local parlance.

Israeli media have paraded U.S. concerns about digital information disclosure as at once
prophetic of things to come and as being different and quintessentially American. The foreign
accent of the coverage of privacy issues stands out both in the close watch reporters keep on
privacy developments—technological, legislative, and regulatory—in the United States (and to a
lesser extent, Europe), and in the breadth and depth of the analyses that they provide. This
detailed complexity stands in a sharp contrast to the scarce reports on privacy issues in Israel.
Few and far between, the local stories speak to the essential confrontation between regulators'
efforts to introduce standards of privacy and common counter-arguments in the name of national
security. The high-tech reporter of HaAretz, Israel's elite newspaper, opined that most Israelis
have not considered Web privacy concerns as relating to their society. He added that the press'
conscious U.S. orientation on these topics reflects a sense that American judicial and legislative
activities raise interesting conflicts and issues that might stimulate thinking in Israel, where
legislative and judicial awareness of this area is undeveloped (Y. Dror, personal communication,
2002).
The relative indifference to privacy violation that the press implicitly attributes to its
audience is in fact in line with the collectivist strands of the country's founding ethos. Israel was
established on an explicit socialist ideology in which individuals were firmly situated as
members and partners in the project of nation-building (see Ben Raphael, 2000), rather than lone
adversaries of big government and centralized power. The country was, and arguably still is, a
“recruited society” (a nation in arms, see Kimmerling, 1993; Kimmerling & Moore, 1997) in
which the boundaries between the self and the collective, between personal needs and desires
and national imperatives and objectives—and thus, between on- and off-stage and between
public and private life—are difficult to outline. Further, while the country has witnessed strong
pulls toward privatization and individualization during the past decade and a half, recurrent
national threats appear to strengthen Israelis' commitment to the collective and reduce whatever
centrifugal tendencies they may have temporarily entertained. Thus, when 15-year-old Ofir
Rahum was kidnapped and murdered by a Palestinian woman he met through the ICQ instant
messenger (just 2 weeks before the Israeli survey), newspaper coverage adopted the conventional
framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict. References to the danger of information disclosure on the
Web were overwhelmingly subordinated to the discourse on national security.
Structurally, too, personal privacy is treated differently in Israel from the U.S. Unlike
Americans, Israelis must carry an official picture identity card. While an American driver’s
license and social security number may seem comparable to the Israeli ID, symbolically and
functionally they are profoundly different (Etzioni, 1999). Israelis' ID numbers identify them in
most of their encounters with both government and non-government institutions (for example,
medical and university authorities), and citizens over 18 are required to carry the card at all
times; the use of the social security card, on the other hand, is legally, normatively, and
practically restricted, while the driver license is, by definition, voluntary. Israelis cannot (or find
it difficult to) reinvent themselves due to both the close watch of the Ministry of Interior (and the
ID it issues) and the country's size; Israelis know each other. Related to that is the fact of the
army. While the myth of universal draft is no longer sustainable, it is nonetheless the case that by
the age of 18, every Israeli youth can expect to be called by the army for pre-military
examinations and checks. The results of the tests form the basis for the personal file that will
accompany him or her in the years to come.
Focusing on Israeli society alone, we might expect that these particular local
circumstances would directly influence Israelis' attitudes about Web privacy. Yet, as we have

seen, very different perspectives on information disclosure in relation to the Web appear on
Israelis' media radar screen in discussions of U.S. (and, to a lesser extent, other international)
business concerns and social reports about the Internet. To what extent, then, do Israelis translate
their relative tolerance for information disclosure offline into their computer privacy practices?
Do they follow the hegemonic preoccupation with the Web's (inevitable) information leakage?
Do they develop a construction of the Web that reflects their traditional information disclosure
practices, or are these global and local influences blended in some way? In an attempt to gain
initial insight into such intertwined transnational cultural interrelationships, we compared U.S.
and Israeli views on the Web, gathered in surveys on Web attitudes that were conducted in the
United States and in Israel.

The Surveys
The U.S. survey was undertaken in early 2000 (Turow & Nir, 2000a, 2000b), before this
comparative investigation was conceived. That survey was a follow-up to a study conducted by
the second author in 1999 (Turow, 1999). The study was the first academic exploration of U.S.
parents' attitudes and reported activities regarding the Web as it related to their children. One aim
of the 2000 survey was to track differences from the previous year's findings regarding what
parents were generally thinking and doing about the Web. To do that, the survey presented
parents with 14 statements about the potential benefits and harms of the Internet for children,
which were asked in the original survey. It asked parents how much they agreed or disagreed
with each of the assertions along a five-point scale, from agree strongly to disagree strongly. The
survey's second aim was to explore an emerging issue. As teenagers were becoming major users
of the Web, commercial sites were increasingly gleaning information from them for marketing
purposes. The 2000 study asked how parents and youngsters (teens and tweens, a marketing term
for 10-12 year olds) conceive of releasing information to Web sites and, if they regarded it as a
problem, whether they wanted anything done about it.
The survey addressed the concern about the Web and the leakage of family information
through 14 statements about privacy and the Web. Parents and youngsters were asked how much
they agreed or disagreed with each of the assertions along a similar 5-point scale. Also included
were scenarios aimed at comparing what the youngsters say would be acceptable for teens to
reveal to Web marketers as compared to what their parents say would be acceptable for teenagers
to reveal.
Although the questionnaire was not created for use in cross-national comparisons, we
realized that a Hebrew translation would offer a unique opportunity. For researchers interested in
the cultural construction of the Web, it could provide an exploratory window on the extent to
which parents in two countries have similar strong beliefs about the technology's benefits and
problems. And, from the specific standpoint of developing a political economy of globalization,
we could note where Israeli respondents located themselves, when it comes to the Web, along
the range between specifically “Israeli” and mediated “American” attitudes to information
privacy.
Roper Starch Worldwide conducted the research for the Annenberg Public Policy Center.
Telephone interviews were conducted with a nationwide cross-section of 1,0015 parents of
children 8- 17 in homes with Internet connections. The Random Digit Dialing (RDD) sampling
methodology was used to locale respondents. During the interviews, parents were asked to
answer questions while thinking about their child aged 8-17, who had the most recent birthday.
When the child the parent had focused on during the interview was at least 10-17 years old, an

attempt was made to also interview that child. When that child was not available, another 10-17
year old child in the household was interviewed. Approximately half of the 304 children 10-17
year-olds that were interviewed were selected from the same households as the parents. The
other half of the children's sample (for which parents were not interviewed) was located using
the Random Digit Dialing (RDD) sampling methodology. All the interviews were conducted
January 13 through February 17, 2000. Interviews with the adults averaged 20 minutes and the
ones with the kids averaged 10 minutes.
The Israeli interviews were conducted by the Machshov survey firm one year after the
ones in the United States (January-February 2001). The RDD and interview procedures used
were the same as in the earlier study.6 The comparison, then, is between random samples of 1001
U.S. adults and 304 adolescents, and 1000 Israeli adults and 305 adolescents, who lived in
households with online computer access and at least one child between ages 8 and 17. This
paper, however, will focus on the parents' responses.

The Survey Findings
The two samples of adults were similar on a number of basic demographic variables. In
each sample, 41% of the respondents were male and 59% were female. The vast majority of each
group (83% of the Americans, 85% of the Israelis) were employed. Similarly, around half of the
parents (57% of the Americans, 55% of the Israelis) were aged 30-44; almost all the rest (33% of
the Americans, 44% of the Israelis) were aged 45-59. Most parents in each sample were married,
though the proportion of married Israelis (92%) was higher than the proportion of married
Americans (79%). Similarly, 50% of the Americans and 45% of the Israelis had college or postgraduate degrees.
It is impossible to know, of course, whether the similarities in these labels actually mask
major cultural differences in what the labels mean. Certainly, the presence of two very different
societies came through in the absence of “race” as a relevant category in Israeli society and its
replacement by “country of birth” and “country of father's birth.” In the same vein, answers
about “household income” point to a very different scale in the two countries, as Israel's average
income is substantially lower than that of the U.S.
In fact, the Israeli survey firm did not consider it appropriate to ask the American income
question, which directly solicited the parent’s family income bracket. Instead, the parent was told
that the net average household income in Israel is 8,000 New Israeli Shekels and asked to state
whether his or her household income was around that average, a lot or a little lower, or a lot or it
little higher. Only 10% responded that they fell below the average, while 57% said they rose
above it—an indication, albeit indirect, that the sample was substantially wealthier than the
nation as a whole. The more “direct” U.S. question was elusive in its own way: Since 26%
refused to report their yearly income, it allowed even less inference about the online families'
socioeconomic standing. Those who did answer, however, reflected a group that was only
somewhat wealthier than the nation as a whole.
Against this backdrop of similarities, differences, and the ambiguous meanings of both,
one major difference stood out immediately between the two samples in relation to use of the
Internet: While 94% of the U.S. adults said that they had personally used the Internet, only 64%
of the Israeli adults reported that. Clearly, a much higher percentage of Israeli than American
parents had bought the service for their children only. Among the Israeli adults who did report
getting on the Internet, the perceived sense of expertise was similar to their U.S. counterparts
(see Table 1).

Nevertheless, that a third of Israelis with the Web at home weren't users at all might
suggest that these Israeli nonusers' privacy attitudes should properly be compared with
Americans who don't have the Web in their homes. The 1999 study comparing the attitudes of
U.S. parents in households with computers but with and without the Web at home found that the
latter were somewhat more negative about the Web's ability to improve their children's lives. The
1999 study didn't plumb privacy attitudes, but it did lead us to wonder whether Israeli parents
with the Web at home who have never used the Internet would be more concerned about privacy
than those who have had direct experience with it.
Table 2 presents the responses to statements about the Web of all the online U.S. parents,
all the Israeli parents, the online Israeli parents who have used the Web, and the online Israeli
parents who have not used the Web. Overall, the differences between the Israeli groups are small
and not significant statistically.7 By contrast, the differences between the Israeli and U.S.
samples are substantial as well as statistically significant.
The answers from the U.S. and Israeli parents to the 14 statements about potential
benefits and harms of the Web reflect very different mind-sets about the Web. U.S. parents hold
strong opinions about its effects. Large numbers believe that it is a useful and even critical
component of a child's education, and large numbers believe, often at the same time, that it gives
youngsters access to content with “troublesome” values. Substantial percentages of Israeli
parents, by contrast, are much more skeptical of the technology. They don't believe the hype
about its advantages and they don’t accept the rhetoric about its dangers. Twice as much as U.S.
parents, however, they worry about their ability to help their children navigate the new
technology.

For example, while 74% of U.S. parents agreed or agreed strongly that “children who do
not have internet access are at a disadvantage compared to their peers who do have access,” only
23% of Israelis answered that way. In fact, on all of the “positive” statements about the Web,
U.S. parents were far more likely than Israeli parents to agree or agree strongly. U.S. parents
were far more prone to say the Web is a safe place, that it helps their kids with homework, that
their children discover “fascinating, useful things,” and that it can help them “learn about cultural
diversity and social tolerance.”
Israeli parents also tend to be mellower about potentially negative effects of the Web than
are their U.S. counterparts. Almost half (46%) do express concern about the Web's ability to
interfere with family values—around the same percentage of U.S. parents expressing the
concern. Yet substantially smaller percentages of Israelis than Americans are concerned about
the possibility of bad effects of specific Web content. Almost twice as many U.S. parents as
Israelis (59% vs. 31%) agreed or strongly agreed that “going on line too often might lead
children to become isolated from other people.” Similarly, 72% of U.S. parents were concerned
over exposure to sexually explicit images on the Internet, as compared to 28% of Israeli parents;
62% of the U.S. parents, and 31 % of Israeli parents were concerned over exposure to violent
images. And, while 741% of U.S. parents reported that they were “concerned that children give
out personal information about themselves when visiting Web sites or chat rooms,” only 24% of
Israeli parents agreed.8
Israeli parents did say in substantially higher proportions than their U.S. counterparts
(48% to 26%) that they “often worry” that they won’t be able to explore the Web with their
children as well as other parents do. That about half of Israeli parents had such a feeling of
deficiency is interesting in view of the Israelis' self-evaluation of Web expertise, which was
similar to U.S. parents, and their overall mellow altitude to Web effects. At the same time,
Israelis' expertise with Web marketers was admittedly relatively limited. Only 25% of them, as
compared to 60% of the Americans, reported that they have read Web site privacy policies more
than once or twice. Moreover, 53% of the U.S. sample indicated that they bought something over
the Internet, compared to only 30% of the Israelis.
We wondered whether these countervailing tensions that didn't show up nearly as much
in the U.S. parent population—mellowness versus a felt deficiency, general expertise versus
specific inexperience with marketers— would translate into clear cultural differences regarding
the teenagers' release of family information to marketers. What we found was more complex
than these straightforward differences. On the one hand, a clear majority of both Israeli and
American parents reflected the kinds of information privacy concerns that the Israeli press had,
in fact, continually discussed as American internet privacy issues. On the other hand, the Israeli
parents did diverge strongly from their U.S. counterparts along cultural lines with respect to
naming who has the responsibility to try to solve these privacy problems.

Responses on Information Privacy
When it comes to the kind, of information parents say are acceptable for teens to give to
Internet marketers, the differences between Americans and Israelis seem to be a matter of degree
rather than of kind. As Table 3 shows, Israeli parents were consistently more likely to agree that
it was acceptable for a teenager to release certain types of information to marketers in exchange
for a free gift. Yet for most categories, the percentages of both Israelis and Americans agreeing
about the giving out of data were well under 40%. Moreover, about the same small percentage of

parents (24% of U.S. and 20% of Israeli parents) said they themselves would answer a variety of
personal questions to marketers in exchange for a free gift when it was given a cash value.
Clearly, then, Israelis' traditionally tolerant attitude toward information disclosure did not show
through strongly here. Most people in both parent populations were uncomfortable about
themselves or their offspring confiding family information to marketers.
Table 4 reflects these differences in degree but also indicates key differences that
distinguish the Israeli from the American perspective on Web information privacy. The table
notes the percentages of Israeli and U.S. parents who agreed strongly or somewhat agreed with
14 opinions about privacy. The table indicates that Israeli parents tended to be generally less
concerned than U.S. parents about Web privacy considerations regarding themselves and their
family. At the same time, for many of the statements, the gap in perspectives between the two
populations wasn't that great (not exceeding 10%).
Answers to several statements do, however, suggest that major cultural differences
between the U.S. and Israeli respondents are also at work. According to one finding, more
American than Israeli parents (60% to 37%) confirm that their concern about Web privacy has
increased since going on line. Another finding indicates that substantially more American than
Israeli parents admit being nervous about Web sites having information about them (72% to
52%). A third finding suggests one reason for the lower percentage of Israelis compared to
Americans: A far smaller segment of the Israeli parents (54% to 31%) knows that Web sites
collect information about them even when they don't submit information. The dissimilar answers
to these statements imply that although Israeli and American parents profess concerns about
information privacy, the Americans are more engaged than the Israelis with concerns about the
Web and how to deal with them.

Additional divergences in the answers between the two groups suggest that when it also
comes to responsibility for knowing about and acting on issues of Web privacy, Israeli parents
depart from their U.S. counterparts in kind, not just degree. The first three statements in Table 4
reflect differences in what might be called a locus or privacy responsibility. An overwhelming
percentage of Americans agreed or strongly agreed that parents (first statement), government
(second statement), and business (third statement) ought to be deeply involved in ensuring a Web
safe from teens' disclosure of information. Israelis, by contrast, were much less invested in the
responsibility of any of these entities. The differences are particularly stark if we look
specifically at the percentage of parents who agreed strongly with them. Agreeing strongly
implies a certain high concern about a policy issue; simply agreeing does not. We found that
only 18% of Israeli parents, compared to 53% of the U.S. parents, agreed strongly that they
expect businesses to help them with privacy—that they “look to see if a Web site has a privacy
policy before answering any questions.” Moreover, while 88% of U.S. parents agreed strongly
that “I should have a legal right to know everything that a Web site knows about me,” only 43%
of Israeli parents felt strongly about it. Similarly, 84% of U.S. versus 43% of Israeli parents
agreed strongly that “teenagers should have to get their parent's consent before giving out
information online.”9
These differences in the locus of responsibility also translate into different practical
conclusions that U.S. and Israeli parents draw from their sense of growing privacy exposure.
While a large proportion (47%) of Israeli parents compared to U.S. parents (10%) note that one
of their children has “given out information he or she shouldn’t to Web sites,” only 4% of the
Israelis (compared to 19% of the Americans) have installed filters to try to keep some control
over the sites the teens can visit—even though one third of the Israelis (and 78% of Americans)
say they have heard of filters. This contrasting attitude toward a parent-initiated technological fix
was even more striking when we explained the functions of filters and monitors to them and
asked them, “If someone offered to help you put an internet filter or monitor on your computer
for free, would you want the filter, the monitor or both?” Whereas 82% of the U.S. parents
wanted one or both of these devices, only 43% of the Israelis did.

Conclusion
This exploratory cross-cultural comparison has yielded patterns of difference and
similarity that speak to both the cultural construction of privacy (and technology) and the
political economy of globalization. The responses by Israeli and American parents reveal very
different perspectives on the Web's power and the locus of responsibility for controlling it. We
noted that Israeli parents are much more skeptical than their U.S. counterparts about the
transforming possibilities of the Web: They don't buy the hype about the Internet's advantages,
and they don’t accept the dystopic rhetoric about its dangers. In comparison, the answers of the
American parents stand out as almost frantic over the impact of the Web (positive and negative)
on their family lives.
Israeli and U.S. parents also don't see eye-to-eye when it comes to important aspects of
domestic privacy and the Web. Far more American than Israeli parents say that their concern
about Web privacy has increased since going online. Far more Americans say, too, that they are
nervous about Web sites having information about them. Israelis also don't have nearly the
commitment the Americans have to parental, governmental, or business solutions to Web privacy
problems. They seem, instead, to feel that teens themselves should shoulder the burden of
policing the borders of privacy.

Seeing these differences side-by-side underscores the constructed nature of the Web. To
explain them, one can point to the traditional Israeli commitment to the collective over the
private and to the continual sociopolitical tension that naturalizes and renders acceptable the
violation of privacy by the government and military. The United States, by contrast, has created a

hallowed position for individual privacy, though in ideal more than in practice. In the words of a
New York Post commentator, “Americans don't like invasions of privacy, be it internet-, health
care- or financial-related” (Lambert, 2001, p. 62). The disjunction between what Americans
believe ought to be and what government and business often refuse to allow creates social
tensions through which public advocacy groups try to force those institutions to create solutions.
Government and business, by contrast, often reply by thrusting the responsibility for protecting
privacy back to the hands of individuals and parents. That may lead to the tripartite solution that
the survey uncovered among Americans, but not among Israelis.
This model highlighting local cultural constructions of the Web and Web privacy does
not, however, fit all our data. We found that a clear majority of Israeli parents set aside their
society's customary laxness over information privacy and agreed with American parents about
the importance of not disclosing information to the Web. The great percentage of parents in both
societies acknowledges being uncomfortable about themselves or their offspring confiding even
rather superficial family information to marketers. Israelis' concerns mirror the American worries
that they had seen and heard through a variety of print and electronic media channels, including a
U.S.-centered Israeli version of the Web.
The similarities and differences imply that a complex dynamic is at work. The findings
indicate that cross-cultural influences are intermingling with local cultural constructions to form
a peculiar mix, neither American nor fully continuous with the Israeli “indigenous” tolerance for
disclosure. We suggest that exposure to U.S. Web issues on Israeli media along with exportminded discussions of U.S. high-tech throughout society are leading Israeli parents to adopt
Web-privacy worries that do not resonate with the nation's traditional privacy practices. Yet
when it comes to the more profound step of actually acting on these issues—deciding if
government or business or parents should take responsibility for preventing information
disclosure—traditional Israeli perspectives on privacy do transfer to the Internet.
These explanations clearly need to be investigated further. What we have as a result of
this research, though, are sharp indicators that a complex combination of forces is shaping Israeli
responses to the Web and strong possibilities that some of those forces originate outside Israeli
society. Comparative surveys across time can help us explore how much, how, and exactly why
Israeli society is becoming more “American” in its attitudes toward the Web as Israeli business
and media continue their Americentric scripts when it comes to high-technology. Comparative
field research is also necessary to understand the actual ways that parents in the two societies
approach the Web on the ground. How they are changed, by how much, and what resistance
there is to “imported” views, are topics that require work both within and across portions of the
global system.
The argument that some influences on Web attitudes reflect the global political economy
even while other influences are local is a position that society-specific cultural accounts often
ignore. Our framework and comparative survey findings suggest that, instead, it is a direction
that needs to be explored. The challenge for researchers—particularly when it comes to countries
outside the center or the world economy, but also in relation to those in it—is to continually
relate people's altitudes, actions, and interactions to the national and global sociopolitical system.
That, metaphorically and practically, is what “the Web” is really about.

1

Notes

This theme is developed in the volume that concludes the project; see Livingstone el al.
(2001), pp. 11-12.
2
About one quarter of Israel's export income consists of high-tech products (see Israel
Central Bureau of Statistics, 2002), Israel leads the world In the number of scientists and
technicians m the work force, with 140 per 10,000 (as opposed to 60 in the U.S., over 70 in
Japan, and fewer than 60 in Germany). The percentage was augmented by the massive influx of
immigrants from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s, which included a large percentage of
scientists, engineers, and technicians. See Hi-Link (2002).
3
That is a high proportion among the world's countries but still considerably smaller than the
approximately 50% of the U.S. homes. This estimation is based on TIM-Teleseker poll data cited
in Barabash (2001) and Central Bureau of Statistics (2002), plate 2.1 b.
4
The Hebrewization of Internet tools (e-mail, Web etc.) is astonishingly slow, suggesting
both the extent of English usage by Israeli surfers, and their readiness to shift to English when
using this medium.
5
The sampling error for percentages based on the entire sample of 1001 parents is
approximately plus or minus 3.5 percentage points. The sampling error is larger for smaller
subgroups within the sample.
6
Although the Israeli study was conducted a year later than the U.S. survey, we have no
reason to believe that societal or technological changes would have caused the U.S. parents'
responses to have changed during that time. It also bears noting that the two samples of parents'
responses to the same questions in the U.S. 1999 and 2000 surveys were strikingly similar to one
another.
7
Differences between these two groups of Israeli parents were also generally not statistically
significant with respect to the variables in Tables 3 and 4, so we do not present them.
8
One finding did seem to diverge from Israeli parents' mellowness: Although 59% of U.S.
parents believe that “people worry too much that adults will take advantage of children on the
internet,” only 19% of the Israelis agreed with the statement. One reason for the higher
percentage not willing to write off concern about adult exploitation might be the highly
publicized Internet-related kidnapping and murder of the Israeli boy that look place two weeks
before the survey. Press coverage might have been fresh in the minds of many of the
respondents, who may consequently have interpreted taking advantage as meaning physical
danger. The answers to the other statements show that the majority of online Israeli parents
seems not to have generalized its worry about the physical danger of adult exploitation through
the Web to other areas of potential concern.
9
All these differences were statistically significant at the .01 level using chi-square.
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